Table 3 Quotations that illustrate theme 3

3

The role of humans in nature

Assessing the moral permissibility of interventions in nature

3A

We should not take up the role of designers of nature by using GDTs

R30: “[I] have a problem with it, there is this nagging idea, that (..) we have this ability to say in a finite way “we’re changing this organism and we’re going to turn this organism from a vector into some type of benevolent tool for our use”

3B

Concerns about the role of humans in nature are part of broader concerns about the impact of humans on earth

R24: “[There is this] very fuzzy sense that it’s nice to try to preserve the natural state of affairs. (..) [We should preserve] the human relationship to nature and the desire to live with the world rather than always changing the world. (..) We're doing an incredibly bad job of that. There's no balance whatsoever at the moment, and gene drives are, you know, not the main story. The main story is (…) climate change, and total ecosystem disruption, deforestation and pollution. (..) But in so far as you know, we’re talking about the ethics of gene drives (..) I do think about (..) applications in that way”

3C

It would be impermissible to suppress or extinct species that humans consider undesirable

R24: “There’s a sense in which gene drives can be thought of as extinction technologies. They’re getting rid of something you don’t want, either the whole population or a subpopulation, the whole species potentially. Or if it’s just a genotype, a phenotype, that you don’t want, you’re trying to get rid of that and turn it into something else. Get rid of the gregarious desert locust, and force it to be this other thing that you think will work better with human life. And those applications that really sort of live into that extinction ideal—if it’s a native organism, like the desert locust, you’re fiddling with it in its home range—are intrinsically somewhat less attractive to me”

3D

We should compare interventions with GDTs to other interventions in nature that we consider morally permissible

R6: “I suppose one context in which we’d want to put is to look comparatively at the kind of interventions we're very happy to do in nature without any without much notion what the consequences will be. And for you know with perhaps much lesser potential benefits, I mean clear cutting a large forest or something (..), probably changing the environmental, meteorological, all kinds of factors in unpredictable ways. Probably for very questionable goals like replacing them with a large plantation of food stuff. (..) it has some relevance to evaluating the way we should think about this kind of intervention, and we should remember that we intervene all the time”

3E

Nature is not good, and this provides a reason to intervene

R22: “[There are] people who feel that nature is important on a spiritual level and that it [should be] unaffected by humanity as much as possible. (..) I completely disagree because in my view much of nature is—well, nature is amoral and that’s a bit of a problem because when you look at it with a moral lens you see an awful lot of animals suffering. (..) I’m not at all convinced that nature is good”

3F

GDTs do not intervene in a ‘natural’ state of affairs

R5: “A lot of the ethical debate around gene drive has the preconception or the assumption that nature is still in a natural state (..) they fail to recognize that there is a[n] (..) assumption from the beginning: that nature created by whatever force is perfect. And then it's perfect and what we're doing today [in] 2019 is affecting it. But we've been here for a really long time”

Balancing the value and interests of humans, non-human animals and nature

3G

Human interests outweigh animal and environmental interest

R26: “I'm big on (..) trying to check my privilege (..). [if] you're a westerner, ecology is allowed to be your biggest concern, versus someone who lives in Africa whose children are dying. And as a human, like, our biggest concerns are human concerns”

3H

The way in which human interests always take precedence should be questioned

R30: "I think we have a very contentious, a very bizarre relationship with nature. (..) [I] think it can be universally agreed upon [that] nature, however you define it, is shrinking and it’s shrinking because we’re ever-expanding. And so the question is: As we ever-expand, what does that mean for us and what does that mean for whoever lives in the remaining nature that still exists? Do we have any obligation being the critter who’s the most exploitative of the planet, the most inconsiderate, the most free-ranging here, and the most volatile and the most detrimental to other species, how do we and do we have an obligation? Is there any kind of moral obligation to take that into account? ”

3I

The interests of humans should not trump the interests of non-human animals and the environment

R19: “I’m seeing, more and more, human beings as part of the whole biosphere and therefore not just having a special claim in a way. Of course I’m a human, so in that sense I can see why, but it seems to me as though humans have been making a special case for their own interests for a very long time, and I don’t know where that’s got us (..) Between the application of (..) island invasive species and malaria, on the surface of it there might seem to be an ethical difference, but in the greater picture of a planet and the fact that we have to change our attitudes to this planet (..), I don’t”

3J

Taking the value and interests of the non-human into account provides conditions for use of GDTs

R32: “It becomes particularly complicated when we’re faced with something like a public-health imperative. (..) How can you say mosquitos are important enough not to save 500,000 lives a year? (..) There must be ways we can uphold both and something like compassion (..) [for both] people who are dying (..) [and] for the environment that could be damaged by making these choices. (..) For example, if you feel the flourishing of both should be supported, then a strategy that has the potential to drive the species to extinction probably doesn’t fit in that model (..). It doesn’t mean there might not be other strategies that could still succeed in reducing malaria transmission through genetic modification of mosquitos”