From: The ethical desirability of moral bioenhancement: a review of reasons
Cluster | Argument | Description/background | Key articles |
---|---|---|---|
1. Why we (don’t) need moral bioenhancement | |||
There is scope for improvement | Almost by definition, each person can be/act/behave better. We therefore all have a moral duty/imperative/reasons to enhance ourselves. We have good reasons for wanting to better ourselves. Also: a duty to do the right thing. | ||
Human biological nature is defective | Humans are innately evil. Evil cannot be eradicated by socialization and education alone. Or: humans are innately good. | ||
Traditional means are (not) effective enough | Such as education, upbringing, socialization. These will only bring us so far. Or: they do suffice, are attractive and effective. | ||
Our only hope in averting major disaster | Avoidance of ultimate harm. Some of the world’s most important problems can be attributed to moral deficits of individuals. Or: those problems have other causes besides the moral deficits of individuals. Moral enhancement should accompany, or even precede/ prioritize over cognitive enhancement and scientific progress. | ||
Moral bioenhancement might reduce criminality | Promise of solving immoral and criminal acts. Or: warning that these are not necessarily the same. | ||
2. It will (not) be possible to reach consensus on what moral bioenhancement should purport | |||
No consensus on the mechanisms that comprise our moral psychology | The way we should interpret neurobiological findings. | ||
Behavioral changes alone are (not) enough | Emotions versus moral reasoning. Dependent on view on what is considered worthy of moral appraisal. Behavioral control, or: certain attitudes towards behavior are also necessary (they have cognitive content). | [2, 5–8, 11, 12, 15, 17, 23, 29, 31, 32, 34, 44, 46, 48–51, 54, 55, 57–67] | |
Ethical systems and theories differ and often disagree | Subjectivity of/disagreement between main (substantive) moral theories. Individuals and cultures differ, there is moral pluralism. Possibility of being neutral between different conceptions of the good. | [1, 2, 4, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 23, 24, 29, 31, 48, 49, 52–55, 63, 64, 67–69] | |
(Im)possibility of considerable consensus | The question whether we can find a common ground, despite moral pluralism. Also: discussions on relativism/nihilism, objectivism. | [1, 7, 13–15, 18, 24, 29, 34, 42, 48, 54, 55, 63, 65, 67, 69–71] | |
Situation- and role-dependency | Situation dependency of what counts as an improvement (morally). Different roles, assessments of situations. Weighing relevant reasons to act. One virtue can turn into a vice dependent on the situation. | ||
Human enhancement versus treating mental disorders | Enhancing humanity or treating mental disorders. Moral element in mental disorders. | ||
3. The feasibility of moral bioenhancement and the status of current scientific research | |||
Status of current scientific research | Further research is needed or, technological possibilities are already there. | ||
Complexity of our moral psychology/biology | Makes it doubtful that we will gain sufficient understanding. | [1, 2, 6, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 28, 33–35, 37, 42, 48, 49, 53, 59, 61–64, 72–74, 76–79] | |
Is morality genetically/biologically determined? For example: are virtues and vices heritable? Is the core of our moral dispositions malleable by biomedical and genetic means? Danger of reductionism: we should not overlook the impact of the socio-cultural environment. | |||
Unintended or undesirable side effects | Interventions have effects beyond the intended effects (also: bluntness of the instruments). | [5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 16–19, 22, 23, 29, 30, 34, 35, 42, 46, 50, 51, 60, 62, 63, 69, 75, 77] | |
A ‘baby and bathwater’ problem. | |||
Moral bioenhancement might even lead to the opposite: not moral progress but moral decline. | |||
Scientific rigor, standards | Research ethical questions about standards of good/sound science. Is scientific experimentation permissible, given that ‘lack of moral virtue’ is not a disease? | ||
4. Means and process of arriving at moral improvement matter ethically | |||
Other (non-biomedical) methods are preferable | Such as moral training, socialization or (self-) education. Taking a pill might seem ‘all too easy’ or too disconnected from ordinary human understanding. Are biomedical means intrinsically bad? Also: man is not supposed to play God. | ||
There is no principled difference between traditional and biomedical means | Results matter, the means less so. | ||
Perhaps the difference lies in the irrevocability/irreversibility of biomedical means. | |||
5. Arguments related to the freedom, identity, and autonomy of the individual | |||
Moral bioenhancement might threaten the freedom of the individual | Moral bioenhancement might impair our freedom and diminish our freedom to act on bad motives. It might subvert moral agency. | [1, 5, 7–9, 15, 17, 20, 21, 28, 29, 42, 44, 49, 51, 55, 58–60, 64, 65, 67, 68, 75, 81, 82] | |
Moral bioenhancement might endanger our identity and autonomy | Questions about personal identity, and ‘true’ versus ‘brute’ self. | ||
Enhancer decides on outcome of moral bioenhancement (paternalism). Might compromise autonomous, informed choice. | |||
Despite concerns about individual liberty and autonomy, a trade-off is justified | The advantages outweigh the disadvantages. | ||
6. Arguments related to social/ group effects and dynamics | |||
Moral bioenhancement benefits others | Unlike other types of enhancements (cognitive, cosmetic, sports). Or: who benefits? The individual or society as a whole? | ||
Moral bioenhancement might foster abuse | Moral bioenhancement might induce free-riding (e.g. prisoner’s dilemma). The virtuous exposed to exploitation by the vicious. It may lead to moral decline. | [1, 5, 8, 9, 14, 15, 22, 31, 33, 42, 48, 56, 61, 63, 64, 66, 76, 79, 86] | |
Moral bioenhancement might undermine moral diversity and moral debate | It might diminish opportunities for ethical thinking/debate. Reasonable pluralism. Moral bioenhancement might generate social inequalities, elitism. | [4, 14, 23, 31, 47, 48, 53, 54, 61, 63, 71, 74, 76, 79, 85, 86] | |
Risks of utopian derailing | Progressive, well-intended, yet… | ||
Utopian. | |||
Interventions will be used recklessly or overenthusiastically. Moral perfectionism. | |||
Mandatory implementation or free/parental choice | State neutrality versus free choice. Danger of tyranny/discrimination. | [2, 9, 13, 15, 20, 21, 30, 38, 39, 44, 45, 48, 53, 54, 56, 63, 66, 68–71, 74, 76, 81, 87] |